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WHOSE SIP IS IT ANYWAY? STATE-FEDERAL CONFLICT IN
CLEAN AIR ACT ENFORCEMENT
STEVE NOVICK
BILL WESTERFIELD*

The Clean Air Act' ("CAA") is a peculiar animal. Like other
federal environmental statutes, the Act owes its existence to the fact that
Congress concluded that the separate states were neither able nor entirely
willing to take the regulatory measures necessary to reduce air pollution
in the United States.2 Yet, Congress determined "that prevention and
control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States
and local governments."3

* Steve Novick is the Senior Attorney for the Environmental Enforcement Section of the
Environment Division of the Department of Justice. He has been with the DOJ since
September, 1987. Mr. Novick received his B.A. from the University of Oregon in 1981
and his J.D. from Harvard University in 1984.
Mr. Westerfield was a Trial Attorney with the Environmental Enforcement
Section of the Environment Division of the Department of Justice from 1986-1994. He
received his undergraduate degree from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
and his J.D. from the University of Texas.
The opinions expressed are those of the authors in their individual capacities and
do not represent the position of the Department of Justice.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. VI 1992).
2. In this regard, note the remarks of Senator Muskie, Chairman of the Environmental
Pollution subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Public Works, in floor debate over
the 1970 Amendments:
In 1963, Congress recognized that the Federal Government could not
handle the enforcement task alone, and that the primary burden would
rest on State and local governments. However, State and local
governments have not responded adequately to this challenge. It is
clear that enforcement must be toughened if we are to meet the national
deadlines. More tools are needed, and the Federal presence and backup
authority must be increased.
116 CONG. REc. 32,901 (1970) (emphasis added).
3. Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 2, 84 Stat.
485, 485 (enacting § 101(a)(3)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3)).
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In 1976, Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker characterized the
language of section 101(a)(3) 4 of the Clean Air Act as "carryover
language," a "vestigial remainder" belied by "the nearly total federal
supervisory and approval authority contained in" the 1970 Amendments to
the Act.' But eleven years later, in hearings on the 1990 Amendments to
the Act, organizations of state air regulators complained to Congress that
the states had received too little direction from the federal government.6
Nowhere is the paradoxical nature of the Act more evident or problematic
than regarding the State Implementation Plan ("SIP") system. Section 110
of the Act directs each state to submit a plan, or set of regulations, for the
"implementation, maintenance, and enforcement" of the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") promulgated by the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") for certain pollutants." The Act directs and
empowers the Administrator of EPA to review and either approve or
disapprove such SIPs.8 Once EPA approves a SIP, either the state or the
federal government may enforce the provisions of the SIP.'
One question that Congress did not address directly in the Clean
Air Act is: "To whom do the courts defer when an approved SIP exists,
and the state determines that a particular source is in compliance, but EPA
disagrees?" Congress apparently envisioned a cooperative state-federal
partnership in which the states would develop and present, and EPA would
approve, clear and straightforward regulations that both the states and EPA
would vigorously enforce. In fact, however, the state and federal
governments have come to blows on several occasions when the federal
government has filed suit against a source that the state considered to be
in compliance. In other cases in which the state has not yet taken a
position on the interpretation of a SIP provision as applied to a particular
source, the source has argued that the federal enforcement action should
be stayed until the state, or its courts, have ruled on the issue in question
because the state's position would be controlling."0

4. See id.
5. 122 CONG. REC. 7330 (1976).
6. See infra Section II.C. For a discussion of the various amendments to the Clean Air
Act, see infra Section II.B.
7. CAA § l10(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1).

8. Id. § Il0(a)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(3)(B).
9. Id.§§ 113, 116, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413, 7416.

10. See generally infra Section I.
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The federal courts, faced with a statute that states that air pollution
control is the "primary responsibility of States and local governments,""
but grants extensive "supervisory and approval authority" to the federal
government, have taken differing approaches to these cases. Some courts
have stated that SIPs are state law, and hence, the state's position, rather
than EPA's, should control in any dispute about the terms of a SIP. Other
courts have stated that because SIPs must be approved and enforced by the
federal government, SIPs are federal law, and the interpretation of the
federal government should control."
Both pro-state and pro-federal courts have addressed the issue in
a summary fashion. Generally, the courts appear to have adopted a
mysterious habit of disregarding other relevant precedent. Although the
authors of this Article find the reasoning of the pro-federal courts more
compelling, the language of the Act provides support for both sides.
Ideally, state-federal conflicts simply would not arise. If the states
did not submit, and EPA did not approve, state SIP provisions unless such
provisions were clear, unambiguous, and acceptable to EPA. In the SIP
process, however, the sovereigns' dedication to the goal of flexibility often
undermines the goal of clarity. For example, several of the state-federal
conflicts analyzed by this Article have arisen in the context of SIP
provisions that have authorized the states to exempt from the literal terms
of the SIP those individual sources meeting "equivalent" limits. In theory,
such provisions serve the laudable purpose of enabling the state to account
for source-specific conditions, while still reaching its emissions targets.
it and the states do not always agree on
In practice, EPA has found that
3
"equivalent.0
of
the definition
This Article will attempt to analyze the cases that address the issue
of state-federal conflict and to identify some factors that have caused such
conflicts and might be likely to cause more in the future. The Article will
first examine the reasoning of the courts which have taken sides on the
issue of "Whose SIP is it?" Next, the Article will offer additional reasons
for viewing SIPs as federal law and deferring to federal interpretations.
The Article will also discuss the circumstances of some of the cases in
which such disputes have arisen. Finally, the Article will examine the
provisions of the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act and the Act's

11. CAA § lO1(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3).

12. See generally infra Section I.
13. See infra Section 11.D.
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implementing regulations to determine the effect of these provisions on the
state-federal conflict.

I. CONFUSION IN THE COURTS

The case that best reflects the confusion in the federal courts over
state-federal conflicts in the administration of SIPs is United States v.
General Dynamics Corp.,4 In this action against General Dynamics, the
federal district court was confronted with a dispute between the state and
EPA on the interpretation of section 115.191 of the Texas SIP." By
reviewing precedent from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, the court uncovered an intra-circuit dispute on how to resolve
state-federal disagreements.
The court discovered that in Florida Power & Light Co. v.
Costle,"6 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "a federal agency
should defer to a state's interpretation of the terms of its air pollution
control plan when such interpretation is consistent with the Clean Air
Act."
The court also noted, however, that in American Cyanamid Co.
v. United States Envtl. ProtectionAgency,' 8 "[t]he Fifth Circuit upheld the
EPA's interpretation because it was not clearly wrong or unreasonable and
did not contradict the Louisiana SIP's plain meaning." 9
The district court in General Dynamics managed to avoid
acknowledging that the FloridaPower and American Cyanamid decisions
were inconsistent. Instead, the court held that the state's interpretation of
the SIP failed even under the Florida Power test because the state
interpretation was "not consistent with the Clean Air Act," "unreasonable,"
and "clearly nonsensical.""0 The court favored the federal government's
interpretation by finding that EPA's interpretation
was "not clearly wrong
l
'i2
binding.
therefore
[was]
and
or unreasonable

14. 755 F. Supp. 720 (N.D. Tex. 1991).
15. Section 115.191 of the Texas SIP governs volatile organic compound emissions from
"miscellaneous metal parts" manufacturing facilities. Id. at 722.
16. 650 F.2d 579, 588 (5th Cir. 1981).
17. General Dynamics, 755 F. Supp. at 722.
18. 810 F.2d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 1987).
19. General Dynamics, 755 F. Supp. at 723.
20. Id. at 722, 723.
21. Id. at 723.
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Judge McBryde was in an odd predicament. Federal district court
judges usually do not resolve disagreements between court of appeals
panels. The traffic is supposed to go the other way. Although Judge
McBryde's situation was somewhat novel, the legal issue he addressed was
not. The doctrinal conflict addressed in General Dynamics had been at
least fourteen years in the making.
The most significant case on the respective roles of the state and
federal governments in administering the Clean Air Act is Train v. Natural
Resources Defense Council.'

Train was a victory for the federal

government because the Supreme Court upheld EPA's approval of a
Georgia SIP provision." The language of the opinion, however, has
repeatedly been invoked to support the state's position in state-federal
disputes.'
The SIP adopted by Georgia in 1971 "provided for immediately
effective categorical emission limitations, but also incorporated a variance
procedure whereby particular sources could obtain individually tailored
EPA approved this provision,
relief from general requirements."'
subject to the requirement that such variances would not "cause the plan
[section] 110(a)(2),"26 and subject to a regulatory
to fail to comply with ...
provision stating that such variances would be deemed "revisions" to the
SIP under section 110(a)(3).' The National Resources Defense Council
("NRDC") argued that such variances should be viewed as
"postponements" of the SIP, which must meet the requirements of section
110(f).3
The Court deferred to EPA's conclusion that such variances should
be treated as revisions. Recognizing "that the Agency is charged with
administration of the Act ...we have no doubt whatever that its

construction was sufficiently reasonable to preclude the Court of Appeals
from substituting its judgment for that of the Agency."29 But in its
holding, the Court provided ammunition to those parties who would later

22. 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
23. Id. at 99.

1977).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Interlake, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ill.
25. Train, 421 U.S. at 69.
26. Id. at 70.
27. Id. at 70, 71.

28. Id. at 71
29. Id. at 87.
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argue that the federal courts should not defer to EPA's interpretation of
SIP provisions:
The Agency is plainly charged by the Act with the
responsibility for setting the national ambient air standards.
Just as plainly, however, it is relegated by the Act to a
secondary role in the process of determining and enforcing
the specific, source-by-source emission limitations which
are necessary if the national standards it has set are to be
met .... The Act gives the Agency no authority to question
the wisdom of a State's choices of emission limitations if
they are part of a plan which satisfies the standards of
[section] l10(a)(2), and the Agency may devise and
promulgate a specific plan of its own only if a State fails to
submit an implementation plan which satisfies those
standards. Thus, so long as the ultimate effect of a State's
choice of emission limitations is compliance with the
national standards for ambient air, the State is at liberty to
adopt whatever mix of emission limitations it deems best
suited to its particular situation.3"
The Court continued by stating that the same logic applied to both initial
SIPs and SIP revisions.31
The Train decision does not mandate a conclusion that the state
interpretation of an approved SIP should control over the federal
interpretation. The decision states that EPA should approve a SIP that
meets the NAAQS, not that once EPA has approved a SIP, the state can
interpret the SIP it any way so chooses.32 Indeed, the Train decision
itself is an example of deference to an EPA interpretation of the Clean Air
Act. Just two years after Train, however, parties were quoting its dicta in
support of the proposition that the United States should not be permitted
to enforce a SIP until the state has construed it.
In United States v. Interlake, Inc.,33 the district court granted the
defendant's request for a stay of a United States' action to enforce a SIP
provision pending a review of that provision by the Illinois Pollution

30. Id. at 79 (footnotes omitted).
31. Id. at 80.
32. Id. at 79.
33. 432 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. II1.1977).
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Control Board ("IPCB"). 3 4 The court observed that "[t]he provisions of
the Illinois Implementation ... Plan here were developed by the IPCB and
adopted by the Administrator" of EPA;35 stated that the "IPCB should ...
be given the opportunity to construct said rules in the first instance;"36
and observed that "plaintiff should defer to the state's interpretation of the
terms of its air pollution control plan when said interpretation is consistent
with the Clean Air Act. 37 In support of this proposition, the district
court quoted Train: "As the Supreme Court has noted, a state may
determine the 'mix of emission limitations' so long as the end result is
compliance with national ambient air standards."38 The court also
observed cryptically that "[pilaintiff's ... argument that it is seeking to
39
enforce its own laws is not significant on this record.1
In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Coste," the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit quoted approvingly the Interlake statement that the
plaintiff "'should defer to the state's interpretation of the terms of its air
pollution control plan. ' ' 4' This observation followed an extensive
discussion of Train.42 The court of appeals also contrasted the "great
flexibility accorded the states
under the Clean Air Act" with the "narrow
43
role to be played by EPA.
The issue before the court in FloridaPower, however, was not the
interpretation of a state-submitted, federally-approved SIP provision.
Rather, the court faced the issue of the propriety of EPA's decision to
unilaterally "insist upon incorporating into Florida's SIP" a provision that
Florida did not intend to become a part of the SIP at all."' EPA argued
that its "incorporation" of the provision was mandated by another provision
of Florida law, but the court of appeals found that interpretation

34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 987.
Id.
Id.

38. Id.
39. Id. at 986.
40. 650 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1981).

41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 588 (quoting Interlake, 432 F. Supp. at 987).
Id. at 586-87.
Id. at 587.
See id.
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"strained. '"'

The court's Interlake quote was clearly dicta because the
interpretation of an approved SIP provision was simply not at issue.
The court in United States v. Riverside Laboratories, Inc.,46 also
quoted the Train.47 As in Interlake, the district court faced a situation
in which the United States was pressing an enforcement action against a
source for violation of a SIP provision while the source was
simultaneously seeking a declaratory judgment in state court that (1) its
facility was not subject to the SIP provision in question and (2) the
application of the SIP provision to the source was unconstitutional.4"
Riverside sough to invoke the Pullman4 9 abstention doctrine, which
provides that a federal court should defer decision on a federal
constitutional issue if the issue might be mooted by a state court
determination of state law. The court ruled that Pullman abstention was
appropriate in this case:
First, there exists a state law -- the Illinois SIP -- that is
unclear in its application to Riverside's manufacturing
operations. The USEPA argues that the SIP is not state
law, but rather is federal law that the USEPA can interpret
and enforce independent of any state court construction.
This argument, however, is contrary to Seventh Circuit
precedent. In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, ... the
court held that the USEPA cannot make an [sic] SIP more
stringent than intended by the state without following the
procedures set out in the Clean Air Act."
The court also cited its own decision in Interlake to support its holding."'
Significantly, the courts in Florida Power and Riverside did not
acknowledge the possibility that the passage of the 1977 Amendments to
the Clean Air Act had undermined the Interlake analysis." Yet, those

45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
678 F. Supp. 1352 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
Id. at 1354.
Id. In this case, the source argued that application of the SIP provision would violate

its due process rights. Id.
49. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
50. Riverside, 678 F. Supp. at 1356-57 (citations omitted).
51. Id. at 1358, 1360 n.13.

52. Florida Power, 650 F.2d 579; Riverside, 678 F. Supp. 1352.
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amendments expanded the federal role to such an extent that courts would
find it difficult to characterize that role as "narrow." 53
Moreover, in Riverside the court's reliance on Bethlehem Steel
Corp. v. Gorsuch4 was something of a stretch. In Bethlehem, EPA had
attempted to "partially approve" a proposed SIP provision by deleting a
part of the provision and thus making the regulation "substantially
tougher.""5 The court concluded that EPA had no authority to partially
approve a SIP provision. As in Florida Power, the issue was EPA's
authority to approve and disapprove SIPs, not its authority to enforce and
interpret approved SIPs. 6 In Bethlehem the court admonished readers of
its opinion not to overemphasize its decision. The last paragraph of the
decision began, "But do not exaggerate the scope of this holding.""7 The
court also stated that EPA can approve part of a regulation and disapprove
the rest, "provided the effect is just to prevent the state from weakening
its previous regulation" and, further, that EPA could use the device of
if it
partial approval "even if the effect is to strengthen [a regulation] ...
is apparent rather than real,
can show that the increase in the stringency ...
or if real is minor."58
In addition to overstating the Bethlehem ruling, and failing to
acknowledge the significance of the 1977 Amendments, the court in
Riverside ignored a contrary ruling by another district court from the
previous year. In United States v. Congoleum Corp., 9 as in Interlake and
Riverside, the defendant moved to stay a federal enforcement action
pending a decision on the interpretation of SIP provisions by a
The defendant, relying on Interlake,
Pennsylvania hearing board.'
argued that the "SIP is state law because the state promulgated [the] SIP
and a state agency administers it."'" But the court in Congoleum
disagreed:

53. See infra Section II.B.3 (discussing the 1977 Amendments).

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

742 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1984)
Id. at 1035.
Id. at 1030.
Id.
Id. at 1037.
635 F. Supp. 174 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
See id. at 175.
Id. at 177.

254

WM. & MARY JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 18:245

Before the EPA adopts the state's plan, the state is free,
subject only to the provisions of the Act, to determine a
mix of emission limitations. When the EPA approves the
state plan, however, the plan is absorbed into federal law....
Additionally, if a provision of the plan were subject to two
possible interpretations, the interpretation given to the
provision by EPA is the proper interpretation. This is
because the other interpretation was not approved by the
EPA and did not properly become a provision of SIP.
Consequently, SIP, after it is adopted by the EPA, is federal
law.
Further support for the holding that SIP, once
approved by EPA, is federal law is found in the fact that
the Act gives the federal district court subject matter
jurisdiction over this case to enforce SIP. As jurisdiction
of the federal court is not based on diversity of citizenship,
it must be grounded on federal question jurisdiction.62
The district court in Congoleum recognized that a flaw existed in
the Interlake logic: the fact that a state has a right to propose any SIP
which will achieve the NAAQS does not mean that, once that SIP is
approved by EPA, the state may then interpret the SIP in any way it so
desires, and EPA must defer to the state interpretation.63 As the court in
Bethlehem observed, the state "proposes," but EPA "disposes."' That is,
the SIP requires EPA's approval to become law. The argument that the
interpretation of the "proposer" is entitled to more deference than that of
the "disposer" makes no sense.
As the court in Congoleum noted earlier in the opinion, once EPA
has approved a SIP, the SIP "may be enforced by the EPA or the state air
pollution control agency, or both."65 Section 113 of the Clean Air Act
grants EPA extensive authority to enforce SIP provisions. Indeed, the
Administrator may make a finding that the state has "fail[ed] ...
to enforce
the plan effectively," and initiate a period of "federally assumed
enforcement."" The Interlake arguments are difficult to justify in light

62. Id. (footnotes omitted).

63. Id.
64. See Bethlehem Steel, 742 F.2d at 1034.
65. 635 F. Supp. at 175.
66. CAA § 113(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(2).
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of these provisions. Congress surely did not intend that EPA, to which it
gave not only the power to enforce the SIPs, but the power to sit in
judgment on the states' enforcement, should be forced to wait for, and
meekly defer to, the states' interpretations of their SIPs.
In 1987, the fifth circuit issued an opinion that, strangely enough,
virtually ignored all prior judicial opinions on the issue. In American
Cyanamid v. United States Envtl. ProtectionAgency, 7 EPA had assessed

an administrative "noncompliance penalty" against the plaintiff for a
violation of the Louisiana SIP." Unlike the court in Congoleum, the
court of appeals was confronted with an honest-to-goodness state-federal
disagreement in that the state "[took] the position throughout the litigation"
that EPA's analysis of the relevant provision was wrong.69 Although the
court "acknowledge[d] Louisiana's important role under the CAA,
especially in formulating SIs," it concluded that it was bound to uphold
the federal interpretation. 0 Unlike the court in Congoleum, which relied
solely on the provisions of the Clean Air Act itself, the court of appeals
relied on general principles of administrative law:
In our judicial review we give great deference to the EPA's
interpretation of the statutory scheme that Congress
entrusted it to administer .... Such deference is justified

because the EPA has developed special expertise in
implementing and enforcing the Act .... Thus, we may not
substitute our own judgment for the EPA's, ... although we

will disapprove EPA decisions that contradict the Act's
plain meaning or intent.7
The court concluded that EPA's interpretation of the SIP provision at issue
"is not 'clearly wrong or unreasonable' and does7 not contradict the
regulation's plain meaning. It is, therefore, binding.
The court of appeals in American Cyanamid did not directly
address the Interlake-Congoleum debate over whether SPs are state or
federal law, but did state that "[o]nce approved, an [sic] SIP becomes part

67. 810 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1987).
68. Id. at 494.

69. Id. at 498.
70. l
71. Id. at 496 (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 498.
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of the nationwide plan that either the EPA or the States can enforce."7
Like the court in Congoleum, the fifth circuit acknowledged that "EPA is
required by the statute to approve a proposed SIP or revision if it meets
the requirements of [section] 42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(2), 7 but the court did
not acknowledge the inconsistency between that statement and its
conclusion that EPA's interpretation controlled.
Unfortunately, the court of appeals did not address the apparent
conflict between its 1987 ruling and the Interlake quote in the 1981
FloridaPower ruling. One year later, in United States v. General Motors
Corp.,75 a district court in the fifth circuit, confronted with the same
issue, elected to follow the FloridaPower dicta and ignore the American
Cyanamid holding.
The critical issue in General Motors was whether the facility had
to comply with an emissions limit contained in the Texas SIP, or whether
the facility could claim compliance by adhering to an alternate method of
76
control ("AMOC") approved by the Texas Air Control Board ("TACB").
EPA argued that "each AMOC must be federally approved as a SIP
revision."77 The district court found that EPA's argument contradicted the
"unambiguous provisions of the Texas SIP" providing for AMOCs. 7' The
court further stated that
[e]ven if section 115.401(a) was ambiguous, the TACB's
interpretation would control. As the ...
Court of Appeals
wrote in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Costle ... "EPA is
to be accorded no discretion in interpreting state law."
Quoting United States v. Interlake, Inc., the court continued,
stating that "[q]uite the contrary is true: the United States
should defer to the state's interpretation of its air pollution
control plan when said interpretation is consistent with the
Clean Air Act." More recently, in American Cyanamid ...
the Fifth Circuit reiterated that "congress, in explaining the
[Clean Air Act], found that the prevention and control of air

73. Id. at 496.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
702 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
Id. at 134, 136-37.
Id. at 135.
Id.

19941

STATE-FEDERAL CONFLICT REGARDING SIPs

pollution ... is the primary responsibility of States and local

governments ...."79

The case immediately preceding General Dynamics in the line of
state-federal conflict cases was United States v. Ford Motor Co."0 The
United States actually lost this case, which like General Motors, involved
the application of an AMOC. 1 In its opinion, however, the court
articulated one of the best arguments in favor of the pro-federal position
on resolving state-federal conflicts. The court found that the pro-state
position on the issue could not be squared with the extensive enforcement
authority Congress had granted to EPA:
Ford cites the undisputed evidence that the [Missouri
Department of Natural Resources] considers Ford to be in
compliance .... Ford argues that ... because Missouri finds
Ford in compliance, this Court must find Ford in
compliance as a matter of law.
Because such a holding would undermine the
enforcement power expressly granted in the Act to the
federal government, the Court cannot find Ford in
compliance as a matter of law. * * *
The legislative scheme of the Act expressly
provides that the federal government may enforce a state's
plan in federal court, a valid, approved SIP having the force
of federal law .... Ford's position would effectively bar
EPA from instituting a suit pursuant to [section] 113 if the
state concludes the source is in compliance with the SIP,
even if EPA's independent evaluation reveals the source is
not complying with the SIP.
As plaintiff correctly notes, such a holding by this
Court would completely eviscerate the independent federal
enforcement authority which is critical to ensure compliance
with emission limits in the SIP. As Congress recognized,
the tension between a state's concern for its environment
and its desire to maintain and build an industrial base is
ever present. Independent federal enforcement authority is

79. Id. (citations omitted).
80. 736 F. Supp. 1539 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
81. Id. at 1553.
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critical to ensure that states do not relax their enforcement
efforts in an attempt to attract industry. 2
Thus, by the time the court in General Dynamics had ruled on its
facts, the federal courts already were divided on the issue of whether state
or federal interpretations of SIP provisions should control. The pro-state
cases relied on the Train dicta and the "primary responsibility" language
of section 101(a)(3). The pro-federal cases relied on the general
administrative law principles of deference to the agency which administers
the federal statute in question; the fact that SIP provisions require EPA
approval; the fact that under the CAA the federal government has
independent authority to enforce the SIPs; and in Ford, the practical point
that by deferring to the states, the courts would be abandoning construction
of the SIPs to sovereigns which may have a strong economic interest in
lenient interpretations.
The pro-federal cases are more persuasive overall, but the issue is
not an easy one. Several additional considerations support the pro-federal
side in the state-federal conflict.

II. ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR DEFERRING To STRICTER FEDERAL
INTERPRETATIONS

A.

"Consistency With the Clean Air Act": An Alternate View

Before considering arguments that the courts have not addressed,
another look at one of the court standards may be helpful. The courts that
tend to defer to the states have stated that deference is due if the state's
interpretation of SIP provisions is "consistent with the Clean Air Act." 3
The meaning of this "standard," however, is not readily apparent. The
Clean Air Act contains many provisions, among them the provisions that
the states write SIPs; that EPA reviews and approves them; and that the
states and EPA should insure that the SIPs are designed to attain
In any dispute arising in a
compliance with the NAAQS.84
nonattainment area, a strong argument exists that "consistency with the

82. Id. at 1550 (citations omitted).
83. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 650 F.2d 579, 588 (5th Cir. 1981)
(quoting United States v. Interlake, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ill. 1977)).
84. See CAA § I10(a)(1)-(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1)-(2).
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Clean Air Act" requires deference to a more restrictive EPA interpretation
of any SIP provision." The purpose of SIPs, after all, is to achieve
attainment of the NAAQS. Indeed, attaining the NAAQS is a primary goal
of the Act itself." In effect, a SIP is a promise by the state that the
regulations embodied in the SIP will achieve attainment.87 Nonattainment
is evidence that the state's promise has not been kept. It would be
thoroughly inconsistent with the purpose of the Act to permit a state that
has already failed to keep its "promise" to worsen the problem by adopting
an unnecessarily lenient interpretation of its SIP.88
In attainment areas, the states have the stronger argument that if the
SIP provides for attainment of the NAAQS under the state interpretation,
adoption of the state interpretation is consistent with the Act.89 An
environmentalist, however, might counter with the plausible argument that
the fundamental purpose of the Act is not mere compliance with the
NAAQS, but clean air. Thus, the interpretation most consistent with the
Act will always be the more stringent interpretation.

The Successive Clean Air Act Amendments:
FederalRole

B.

The Expanding

An additional argument in favor of the pro-federal cases is what
one might call the "Baker argument." This argument states that the
evolution of the statute itself, which has tended to place an increasing
amount of supervisory power in the hands of the federal government,
supports the proposition that when any doubt exists concerning whose
word should be law, the doubt should be resolved in favor of EPA.
When Senator Baker characterized the language of section 101(a)(3) as a
"vestigial remainder," the year was 1976. The Clean Air Act to which he
referred was that created by the 1970 Amendments. 0 The Supreme
Court, at least, seems to have disagreed with Baker, as evidenced by its
Train ruling just a year before.9

85. See United States v. Ford Motor Co., 736 F. Supp. 1539 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
86. CAA § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
See generally id. § 110(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(i).
See Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 61 (1975).
See supra note 3-5 and accompanying text.
See 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
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The subsequent history of the Act demonstrates that even if Baker's
characterization was inappropriate in 1976, it is thoroughly appropriate in
1994. If the "federal supervisory and approval authority" granted by the
1970 Amendments was "nearly total," the authority granted by the 1977
and 1990 Amendments was even greater and thoroughly inconsistent with
the Train-Florida Power notion that the federal government plays a
"narrow," "secondary" role.92

1.

The Air Quality Act of 1967. The First Clean Air Act

Although the series of federal laws dealing with air pollution date
back to the mid-1950s,93 the first federal legislation to establish a system
of state-federal cooperation to battle air pollution was the Air Quality Act
of 1967 ("AQA").94 The AQA gave the federal government an
exclusively advisory role, and left almost total responsibility for regulating
air pollution in the hands of the states, where such power had traditionally
rested. Among other things, the AQA required the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare ("HEW") to establish "criteria of air quality
standards" for "air quality control regions," and to report on pollution
control techniques based on the latest technology.95 The AQA gave states
the responsibility for promulgating ambient air quality standards based on
those criteria, and for setting compliance schedules for air pollution
sources within its air quality control regions. The AQA required states to
report their actions in implementation plans submitted to HEW.96
The AQA, however, contained no mechanism for requiring the
states to fulfill their obligations. This was reflected in the statistic that
only twenty-one states submitted plans between 1967 and December 1970,
and no implementation plans were approved by the federal government.97
Thus, although the AQA can be characterized as the first Clean Air Act
92. See generally id.; Florida Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 650 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1981).
93. Congress passed the first federal act dealing specifically with air pollution on July
14, 1955. An Act to Provide Research & Technical Assistance Relating to Air Pollution
Control, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955).

94. Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q).
95. Id. § 107(a)-(c), 81 Stat. 485, 490-91, repealed by Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4, 84 Stat. 1676, 1678.
96. Id. § 108(c)(1)-(2), 81 Stat. 485, 492 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7415).
97. J.

DAVIES, THE POLITICS OF POLLUTION

52-53 (1970).
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because it introduced organizing principles that endured in later versions
of the Act, it was still a scheme that left almost complete autonomy for
regulating air pollution in the hands of the states.

2.

The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: The Act Gets Teeth

Responding to the burgeoning public interest in pollution control
in the late 1960s, Congress dramatically expanded the role of the federal
government in regulating air quality by enacting the Clean Air
Amendments of 1970 ("1970 Amendments")." The 1970 Amendments
established the current scheme of federal supervision and control of air
pollution.
One of the principal vehicles of increased federal control in the
1970 Amendments was the creation of the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards ("NAAQS"). Under the AQA, the states set their own ambient
air quality standards. The 1970 Amendments made the establishment of
air standards the exclusive responsibility of the newly-created EPA.99
The 1970 Amendments retained the AQA requirement that the
states prepare SIPs, but made attainment of the federally established
To assure that the states would attain the
NAAQS obligatory."°
NAAQS, Congress established the now-familiar requirement that the states
submit their SIPs to EPA. Congress then charged EPA to review and
approve the SIPs to assure that they were adequate to attain the NAAQS
by the dates specified in the statute.'
The 1970 Amendments granted EPA another power: the power to
order sources to comply with SIP requirements and to seek enforcement

98. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q).
99. The 1970 Amendments empowered EPA to establish primary (or more stringent)
standards for the protection of human health, and secondary standards for the protection
of agriculture, ecosystems and aesthetic values. Id. § 4, 84 Stat. 1676, 1679-80 (adding
§ 109) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7409).
100. Id § 4, 84 Stat. 1676, 1680 (adding § 110(a)(1)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(a)(1)).
101. The 1970 Amendments required attainment of the primary NAAQS "no later than
three years from the date of [plan approval]," which meant 1975, or 1977 if certain
extensions were granted. Id. § 4, 84 Stat. 1676, 1680-83 (adding § 110(a)(2)) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)).
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of the SIPs in federal court." In addition to granting EPA independent
authority to enforce SIP provisions, the 1970 Amendments added a
provision that allowed EPA to take over a state's SIP enforcement program
if EPA found widespread violations of the SIP and a wholesale failure on
the part of the state to enforce its SIP."°3
Although the 1970 Amendments did not alter the statement that
pollution control was the "primary responsibility of States and local
governments," Senator Baker's description of that statement as a "vestigial
remainder" of the prior scheme is understandable. EPA's power to set the
NAAQS, its approval authority over SIPs, and its independent and
supervisory enforcement established EPA as the big brother of the states
in the NAAQS attainment program."° More specifically, the relative
powers and responsibilities created by the 1970 Amendments in section
110 inserted EPA into the process of designing and implementing
05
SIPs.

3.

The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments: Response to Failure

In the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments" 6 ("1977 Amendments"),
0 7 to the Act ("Part D"). Congress designed Part
Congress added Part D"
D to deal with the failure of the 1970 Act to produce attainment. As
implementation of the 1970 Amendments occurred throughout the 1970s,
Congress and state and EPA officials realized that the problem of

102. Id. § 4, 84 Stat. 1676, 1686-87 (adding § 113) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413)

103. Id. § 4, 84 Stat. 1676, 1686 (adding § 113) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
7413).
104. The 1970 Amendments granted EPA other responsibilities, including producing its

own SIP for a state in the event the state failed to do so; approving SIP revisions; funding
implementation of the state programs; and extending NAAQS compliance deadlines. See
id. § 4, 84 Stat. 1676, 1686-87 (adding §§ I10(a)(3), (c), (e)-(f), 109), partially repealed
by Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 101(d)(3)-(5), 104 Stat.
2399, 2409 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(3), (c), (0).
105. R.H. Rosenberg, Cooperative Failure: An Analysis of Intergovernmental
Relationships and the Problem of Air Quality Non-Attainment, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L.

13, 23 (1990); see also supra note 104.
106. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q).
107. Id. at § 129, 91 Stat. 685, 746-51 (adding §§ 171-178) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508).
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nonattainment was much broader than any had envisioned."'
The
congressional response to this predicament was to continue the same
scheme of state planning and federal supervision, but to expand federal
control over SIP formulation by states and enhance federal enforcement
power to bring the dilatory states into line.
The 1977 Amendments required the states to revise their SIPs to
achieve attainment by the new statutory deadline of December 31,
1982."°' Most significantly, Part D required the states to adopt a number
of specific requirements for nonattainment areas. Part D mandated that
SIPs should "require ...
such reductions in emissions from existing sources
in the area as may be obtained through the adoption, at a minimum, of
reasonably available control technology (RACT)."" °
Part D also
required a stringent permitting process for new or modified sources and
schedules for compliance."'
EPA's responsibilities under the 1977 Amendments included
examining these circumscribed SIP revisions to assure that they would
provide for attainment. EPA, however, did not simply wait for the states
to propose SIPs by the statutory deadline. Instead, the agency took an
active role in clarifying the Part D requirements, particularly the
requirement that SIPs provide that sources adopt RACT and, thus,
dramatically expanded its role in the drafting of SIPs.

108. In 1976, EPA instituted an interim policy to limit development in severely polluted
areas while trying to maintain the goal of attainment. The policy was termed "offset" or
"trade-off," and it allowed new facilities in polluted areas if their new emissions were
offset by a corresponding reduction in emissions from existing facilities. 41 Fed. Reg.
55,524, 55,528-29 (1976).
109. 1977 Amendments § 129(b), 91 Stat. 685, 747-48 (adding § 172(b)) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)). The 1977 Amendments established the classifications
of attainment, nonattainment and unclassifiable areas. Id. § 103, 91 Stat. 685, 687-88
(amending § 107(d)(1)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(1)). These
classifications were proposed to EPA by the states based upon data they gather through
highly technical analyses, such as direct monitoring data or diffusion computer model
projections. Id The 1977 Amendments continued EPA's traditional role of reviewing
and approving the designations. Id. Redesignations occurred in the same way, with states
submitting requests, and EPA approving or disapproving them. Id. § 103, 91 Stat. 685,
688 (amending § 107(d)(3)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(3)).
110. Id § 129(b), 91 Stat. 685, 747-48 (adding § 172(b)(3)) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 7502(b)(3)).
111. Id § 129(b), 91 Stat. 685, 747 (adding § 172) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

§ 7502).
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Section 108(b) of the 1977 Act directed EPA to "issue to the States
and appropriate air pollution control agencies information on air pollution
control techniques" for particular industries." 2 Between 1977 and 1982,
EPA issued Control Techniques Guidelines ("CTGs") for twenty-three
industry categories, covering topics such as "Control of Volatile Organic
Surface Coating of Cans, Coils, Paper, Fabrics and
Emissions from ...
Light-Duty Trucks" and "Control of Hydrocarbons from Tank Truck
Gasoline Loading Terminals." When the states submitted their SIPs, EPA
used the CTGs as guidelines in determining whether the states had fulfilled
the statutory mandate to require sources to employ RACT to reduce
emissions. The states generally accepted the CTGs as defining RACT." 3
The 1977 Amendments also granted EPA broader enforcement
powers to coerce the states into preparing and implementing tougher SIPs.
First, Congress enhanced EPA's power to promulgate implementation plans
in the event states failed to submit adequate plans for attainment." 4
Second, EPA was granted new authority to prohibit construction of major
stationary sources in any nonattainment area for which the state failed to

112. 1970 Amendments § 4, 84 Stat. 1676, 1679 (adding § 108(b)(l)) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 7408(b)(1)).
113. EPA's authority to define RACT was confirmed in National Steel Corp. Great
Lakes Steel Div. v. Gorsuch, 700 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983). In National Steel, a steel
manufacturer challenged EPA's authority to define RACT for iron and steel sources in
Michigan. After compiling a guidance document summarizing data on control technology
at iron and steel sources of particulate matter, EPA announced that it "would combine this
data with that presented by the state and then approve, disapprove or conditionally
approve all elements of the SIPs submitted." Id. at 319. EPA then disapproved some
Michigan emission limitations "because data contained in EPA's RACT materials
indicated that more stringent limitations would be achievable." Id.
Great Lakes Steel argued that "the imposition of EPA's own standards has
improperly usurped the statutory role of the state." Id. at 322. In response, the court of
appeals dutifully recited the Train formula that the states "have the primary responsibility
is purely a secondary
for attaining and maintaining air quality. The role of the EPA ...
approving a SIP is to
before
obligation
statutory
that
"EPA's
also
noted
it
one." Id. But
use of its own
"EPA's
that
and
concluded
id.,
for,"
provided
is
actually
RACT
that
ensure
role." Id. at
statutory
its
with
keeping
in
[is]
data for making its RACT determinations
323.
114. 1977 Amendments § 108(d)(l), 91 Stat. 685, 694-95 (amending § 110(c)) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)). The statute generally empowered EPA to
promulgate a "federal implementation plan" or "FIP" within two years of determining that
a state has failed in its obligations. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c).
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prepare and submit an adequate SIP." 5 Third, EPA and the Department
of Transportation were empowered to deny the states federal funding for
use in nonattainment areas for which states failed to consider needed
transportation controls to achieve attainment.' 6
Fourth, Congress
prohibited states from receiving funding under the Act in cases in which
EPA determined that the state was not implementing its plan." 7 Finally,
EPA was given discretionary authority to deny a state funds for the
construction of sewage treatment plants if it found that the state's plan did
not adequately deal with emissions associated with the plants."'
By mandating new provisions for incorporation into SIPs, and
giving EPA the authority to enforce those mandates in the SIP approval
process, Congress dramatically limited the states' theretofore "considerable
latitude" to formulate SIPs to attain the NAAQS, at least in nonattainment
areas. By granting EPA new authority to coerce state compliance with
their obligations, Congress altered the balance of power under the Clean
Air Act even further.
Thus, the Clean Air Act after the 1977 Amendments was not the
same Clean Air Act that the United States Supreme Court had interpreted
in Train. While the 1977 Amendments reiterated that "the prevention and
control of air pollution ... is the primary responsibility of the States and
local governments ... ," the Act drastically curtailed the liberty of the states
"to adopt whatever mix of emission limitations it deems best suited to its
particular situation."" 9 Far from occupying a "secondary" role in the
drafting and enforcement of SIPs in nonattainment areas, EPA was
"transformed [by the 1977 Amendments] into the superior force endowed
with punitive powers."''
Thirteen years later, when Congress would
next amend the Act, the "superior force" would grow even stronger.

115. 1977 Amendments § 108(b), 91 Stat. 685, 694 (amending § 110(a)(2)(1)) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(I)).
116. Id. § 129(a), 91 Stat. 685, 749-50 (adding § 176(a)), repealed by Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 110, 104 Stat. 2399, 2470.
117. Id. § 129(b), 91 Stat. 685, 749-50 (adding § 176(b)), repealed by Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 110, 104 Stat. 2399, 2470.
118. lId § 306, 91 Stat. 685,777-78 (adding § 316(b)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

§ 7616(b)).
119. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975).
120. Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 28.
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The 1990 Amendments: The End of the Myth of Cooperative
Federalism

Despite the detailed nonattainment provisions in the 1977
Amendments, the Clean Air Act again was substantially ineffective at
achieving attainment of the NAAQS in large urban areas. By the time
Congress finally passed the 1990 Amendments, 2' about one hundred
areas remained nonattainment areas for ozone. Many other nonattainment
areas existed for carbon monoxide, particulate matter, and sulfur
dioxide.' 22 The intractibility of the ozone and carbon monoxide
attainment problem made it clear that Congress had to respond.
One of the states' biggest complaints about the 1977 Amendments
was that EPA did not provide enough technical guidance to help them
formulate SIP rules that would provide for attainment. In response,
Congress charged EPA with preparing a number of new technical guidance
documents. First, the 1990 Amendments required EPA to promulgate
guidelines for better air quality monitoring techniques and air emission
source inventories. 3 Second, EPA was expected to publish information
within one year regarding sixteen transportation control measures that
could be employed by the states.' 24 Third, EPA was given three years
to develop and issue new CTGs for aerospace and shipbuilding coatings
of stationary source
and solvents, and eleven other unidentified categories
25
Volatile Organic Compounds ("VOC") emissions.
These measures met the states' call for more technical assistance
in writing SIPs. The measures also, presumably, reduced the likelihood of
state-federal disputes over the meaning of SIP provisions. If a state
incorporates a federally-developed CTG into its SIP, the state's argument
that it knows best what a particular SIP provision means loses some of its
force.

121. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q).
122. JOHN QUARLES & WM. H. LEWIS, A GUIDE TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT PROGRAM As

AMENDED IN 1990 17 (Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1990). As of 1989, the estimate was
that over 150 million Americans lived in areas with air quality that violated the primary
NAAQS. See S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 11 (1989).
123. CAA § 108(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(b).
124. Id. § 108(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(f)(1).
125. Id. § 183(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 751 lb(a)-(b).
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Congress also gave EPA additional input over the content of SIP
revisions by directing EPA to issue minimum criteria for reviewing
SIPs.126 The 1990 Amendments do not require EPA to act on a SIP
revision until it receives a state's submission of the information identified
in the minimum criteria." The apparent effect of this requirement is
that EPA has additional control over the contents of SIP revisions.
Congress also specified additional control measures for the new
subcategories of nonattainment areas created by the 1990 Amendments.
Whereas the 1977 Amendments classified areas as "attainment,"
"nonattainment," and "unclassifiable," the 1990 Amendments divided
nonattainment areas into more precise subcategories for certain pollutants.
For example, the 1990 Amendments classified ozone nonattainment areas
These
as "marginal," "moderate," "serious," "severe," or "extreme." '
designations determine the specific measures of emissions control that the
state SIPs must include. For instance, in serious, severe and extreme
ozone nonattainment areas, nonattainment area plans must implement a
clean-fuel fleet program," 9 and adopt "enhanced" programs for motor
vehicle inspection and maintenance. 3
Futhermore, Congress expanded EPA's authority to approve SIPs
in another important regard. One of the arguments that the court in
Bethlehem offered in support of its conclusion that state law should govern
the SIP was EPA's inability to partially approve or disapprove a SIP
proposal if the approval or disapproval made the SIP more stringent.'
The 1990 Amendments confirmed EPA's power to partially approve a SIP
submission."'

126. Id § 110(k)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(1)(A).
127. Id.

128. Carbon monoxide areas can be classified as either moderate or serious. Id. §
186(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7512(a)(1).
129. This provision applies only for those areas having populations greater than 250,000

people. The program requires that motor vehicle fleets with more than 10 vehicles have
a certain number of vehicles that run on "clean fuels." Id. § 182(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. §
751 la(c)(4).
130. "Enhanced" programs are required to incorporate computerized emission analyzers,

or minimum repair expenditures. Id § 182(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 751 la(c)(3).
131. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, 742 F.2d 1028, 1035-36 (7th Cir. 1984); see
also Abramowitz v. EPA, 832 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Riverside
Laboratories Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1352, 1356-57 (N.D. Ill. 1988).

132. CAA § 110(k)(3)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(3)-(4).
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Finally, the 1990 Amendments gave EPA a more active role in
managing, as opposed to enforcing, SIPs by requiring increased federal
oversight of the states' administration. For example, each state must
incorporate annual reporting to EPA of new air pollution control measures
taken during the year into its SIP, and if applicable, explain its failure to
meet certain SIP obligations during the year.'33 Additionally, states must
submit periodic emission inventories" to EPA and revise automobile use
assumptions every three years if they find that they have underestimated
use. 135

Thus, the 1990 Amendments, like the 1977 Amendments, serve to
increase federal participation in implementing SIPs, and reduce state
latitude in formulating the preferred mix of measures to achieve
compliance with the NAAQS. Although the basic scheme remained
unchanged, the 1990 Amendments drastically reduced each state's
discretion over the content of its SIP. The present version of the Clean
Court interpreted
Air Act is a world removed from that which the Supreme
13 6
in Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council.
Although the 1990 Amendments still echo the idea that "air
pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of the States and local
governments,""' Senator Howard Baker's characterization of that
language as a "vestigial remainder' ' 38 rings much truer in 1994 than it
did in 1976. In the future, courts faced with state-federal disputes over the
application of SIP provisions should thoroughly consider the long
evolution of the Clean Air Act before they invoke the language of
Interlake,'39 or even the language of Train.'o

133. Id. § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. § 187(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7512a(a)(1).
Id. § 182(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(c).
421 U.S. 60 (1975).
CAA § 101(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 4701(a)(3).
See supra note 3-5 and accompanying text.

139. United States v. Interlake, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. II1. 1977).

140. See supra Section I.
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The State BureaucratsSpeak: Confessions of Weakness

The Court in United States v. Ford Motor Co."' rejected the
defendants' argument that courts should, in all cases, defer to the state on
the interpretation of SIP provisions. 42 Perhaps the best argument against
deference to the states in state-federal battles on the implementation of SIP
provisions was set forth by the district court in Ford: states have strong
motives for leniently interpreting SIP provisions. 43 The court did not
cite any independent studies of this issue. It simply used common sense.
Substantial empirical support exists, however, for the court's conclusion.
Ironically, the testimony of state regulators themselves provides the
strongest evidence. In fact, the statements that state regulators made to
Congress and congressional investigators in the years leading up to the
1990 Amendments call into question the viability of the congressional
declaration which has become the foundation of the pro-state position: "air
pollution prevention ... and ... control ... is the primary responsibility of
States and local governments."'"
In March and April of 1987, the Environmental Protection
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works
held hearings on the topic of "ozone and carbon monoxide standards; [and]
14
' Among the witnesses who testified before the
nonattainment issues.""
subcommittee were a number of state regulatory agency representatives.
Intuitively, one might assume that these witnesses would guard state
prerogatives under the Clean Air Act. For example, one might expect
these regulators to warn against the imposition of rigid federal standards,
stress the importance of "flexibility," and insist that the states should
continue to have wide latitude in developing and implementing SIPs.
Instead, to the apparent surprise of the senators, the witnesses said things
like the following:

141. 736 F. Supp. 1539 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
142. The court observed that blanket deference to states would undermine the federal
enforcement role, a role which is critical because "the tension between a state's concern

for its environment and its desire to maintain and build an industrial base is ever present."
ld at 1550.
143. Id.
144. CAA § 101(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3).
145. Ozone and Carbon Monoxide Standards: Nonattainment Issues: Hearings on S.
54 Before the Subcommr. on Envtl. Protection of the Senate Comm. on Envtl. and Public
Works, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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Mr. Theiler: I think Congress also ought to very
clearly direct EPA to promulgate certain control measures,
some of them that I touched upon. In addition, Congress
should very specifically mention areas that they should
come up with guidance for the State to implement. There
are 13 areas for reasonable [sic] available control
technology guidelines, that we need Federal guidance on.
It makes it almost impossible to develop individual State
recommendations without that.
Senator Baucus: You are basically saying States
want more direct guidelines and more precise standards and
more direct direction?
Mr. Theiler: Exactly. That's exactly what I'm saying.
Senator Baucus: You want less discretion?
Mr. Theiler: Less discretion in terms of the areas
we need to deal with. Adequate discretion to deal with
localized conditions and some ability to deal with the real
world but not as much discretion and not as much lack of
leadership as we are getting at this time from EPA. We
need stronger penalties for failure to produce.'46
The testimony of Donald Theiler, the Director of the Bureau of Air
Management of the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources, mirrored
that of other state regulators who testified before the subcommittee. Stan
Nikkila, Staff Director of the Missouri Air Pollution Control Program and
Vice-President of the multistate State and Territorial Air Pollution Program
Administrators, stated:
[O]ur past experience has shown that the system works best
when U.S. EPA establishes reasonably available control
technologies through the promulgation of control technique
guidelines ....
From direct personal experience, I can tell you it is
extremely difficult for a State to adopt and implement
control measures which have not been specifically required
by U.S. EPA .... Like it or not, EPA continues to be
perceived as the font of all environmental knowledge and

146. Id. at 39-40.
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therefore, if a particular measure is not required by EPA, it
is asked, how can it be credible. 47
One wonders what the justices in Train would have thought of
Theiler's and Nikkila's testimony. The two state regulators do not seem
enamored of their "liberty to adopt whatever mix of emission limitations"
they deem "best suited." 4 ' Instead, they asked for specific requirements.
They did not seem to view EPA's role as "secondary;" rather, they are
completely dependent on the Agency's guiding hand.
In 1989, the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment
("OTA") conducted workshops with state and local air pollution control
agency officials to explore the reasons why the state-federal effort since
the passage of the 1977 Amendments has not resulted in more areas
achieving the standard.' 49 According to the OTA report, the comments
by those officials in the workshops confirmed and elaborated on the points
raised in the 1987 hearings. The report further supported the argument in
Ford that states are under substantial pressure to make their SIPs as liberal
as possible for industry.
State workshop participants ...
argued that they were unable
to promulgate the additional regulations necessary to
achieve the requisite VOC emission reductions. First, they
suggested that many State regulators face legislative
prohibitions or political pressure not to adopt particular
control measures unless they are clearly forced to do so by
EPA. Second, they suggested that State agencies often do
not have the resources or technical expertise needed to
develop new regulations on their own. State participants
complained that EPA stopped issuing CTGs in recent years,
leaving them without a clear Federal directive to issue
particular regulations and without the resources to develop
their own regulations. They also argued that it is more
resource efficient for EPA to develop regulations or CTGs
once than for each State to duplicate the activity ....
'o

147. lit at 14.
148. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975).
149. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PUB. No. OTA-O-412,
CATCHING OUR BREATH: NExT STEPS FOR REDUCING URBAN OZONE, at 32 (1989).
150. MaJat 34.
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State workshop participants' comments on the states' use of atmospheric
models to predict emissions and to predict the emission reductions
expected from SIP provisions also reflected a cynical view of the state
regulatory process.
State participants suggested that a second problem with
models was that delegation of responsibility for applying
models to the States provided them with ample
opportunities to cheat in developing their implementation
plans, a practice known as "gaming." States were able to
choose favorable model assumptions and inputs to arrive at
the least stringent predictions of emission reduction
requirements .......
The state officials' testimony strongly suggests that the purposes of
the Clean Air Act would be ill served if the courts adopted the rule that
in state-federal disputes over the implementation of the Act, the states'
position should control. Sustaining the argument that the states' position
should trump EPA's is hard when the states themselves acknowledge that
they need mandates from EPA in order to make the Clean Air Act
work. "' Presumably, as the court in Ford believed, the same political
pressures which inhibit the regulation-development process are likely to
play a role in the individual enforcement cases in which disputes over SIP
provisions arise. States are just as likely to cheat in enforcing their SIPs
as they are in preparing the atmospheric models on which SIP provisions
are based.
As stated above, the reasoning of the pro-federal judicial decisions
appears to be inherently more compelling than that of the pro-state
decisions. The state officials' testimony, and the history of the Clean Air
Act itself, provide additional support for the proposition that in cases of

151. Id.
152. Note, however, that the existence of cases such as General Motors, Ford, and
GeneralDynamics makes clear that state regulators do not always welcome direction from
EPA. In individual cases, some of them, at least, have fought for their right to exercise
whatever discretion they think EPA has given them. This fact, however, is not really
inconsistent with the regulators' comments in the OTA workshop. Their actions in those
cases may have been motivated by precisely the kind of pressure they acknowledge.
Thus, although this discussion does not suggest that all state officials hold the same views,
the significant fact remains that a number of officials, some representing multistate
organizations, adhere to the "anti-discretion" school.
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conflict, the federal interpretation of SIP provisions should be entitled to
greater deference.

Ideally, however, EPA and the states should be able to avoid such
conflicts entirely. The states should propose, and EPA should insist on,
unambiguous, enforceable SIP provisions. The next Section suggests that
this has not always been the case.

III. RUNNING AMOC: THE DANGERS OF "FLEXIBILITY"
In some of the state-federal disputes previously discussed, the
dispute arose simply because one of the sovereigns was determined to be
unreasonable. In GeneralDynamics, for instance, the state supported an
interpretation of a SIP provision which had the effect of encouraging the
facility to emit excess VOCs." The district court found the state's
position "clearly nonsensical.""'' EPA would have found it difficult to
avoid that dispute through more careful SIP review.
In other cases, however, the solution to the state-federal dispute
was far less obvious. In these cases -- American Cyanamid, General
Motors, and Ford -- EPA approved SIP provisions which delegated

discretionary authority to the states, but then sought to challenge the
'
manner in which the states chose to exercise that discretion. 55
During the 1980s, many states submitted, and EPA approved, SIP
provisions which provided that a state official, usually the director of the
state's air pollution agency, could approve means or methods of emissions
control that differed from the methods specifically described in the SIP,
and thus specifically approved by EPA, if such alternative means of

control ("AMOCs") were "equivalent" to those prescribed by the SIP. 56
These provisions were proposed by the states, and approved by EPA to

give states and industry greater flexibility. The theory was that if a source
could maintain a level of emissions that did not exceed that allowed for by
the SIP, by adhering to a restriction somewhat different from that
prescribed by the SIP, the states should be permitted to allow them to do

153. 755 F. Supp. at 720.

154. Il at 723.
155. American Cyanamid,810 F.2d at 493; GeneralMotors, 702 F. Supp. at 133; Ford,
736 F. Supp. at 1539.
156. See CAA § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (providing the states with the authority to
develop their own emissions control plans subject to the approval of EPA).
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so. The assumption was that individual sources might be able to identify
means of control which were equivalent to, but more efficient, and thus
less costly, than the generic restrictions in the SIPs.
Once the states began to exercise this authority, however, they
in conflict with EPA over the extent of their discretion
themselves
found
and over the meaning of "equivalence."

A.

American Cyanamid: A Close Call

The first battleground in the "equivalence" wars was the State of
Louisiana. In American Cyanamid v. United States Envtl. Protection
Agency,'57 EPA cited American Cyanamid for a violation of Louisiana
SIP rule L.A.Q.R. 22.3, which limited VOC emissions from "large" storage
tanks i.e those containing more than 40,000 gallons. The rule required that
such tanks be equipped with one of several listed "vapor loss control
The list of devices included "other equivalent equipment or
devices".'
means as may be approved by [Louisiana]. '"59
The "other equivalent equipment or means" which American
Cyanamid proposed was the application of a "bubble" concept.' ° Instead
of installing physical vapor control devices on the tanks, American
Cyanamid proposed to limit VOC emissions from another and much larger
VOC source at the same facility.' 6 ' The Louisiana SIP called for a
seventy percent overall reduction of VOC emissions at the facility.
American Cyanamid's "bubble" proposal would have reduced overall
emissions by at least that amount, while allowing the company to avoid
installing control equipment on the large tanks."
The State of Louisiana sided with the company and approved
American Cyanamid's bubble as an "equivalent means."'63 EPA,
however, argued that a "device" could only be a physical piece of

157. 810 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1987).

158. These devices included as an external floating roof, an internal floating roof, or a
vapor gathering and disposal system. Id. at 496.
159. Id. at 497.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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equipment, and the "bubble" did not qualify.'" The court stated its view
that "the bubble concept encourages emissions reduction in the most
efficient manner and that specific equipment standards may increase the
cost of pollution control,"'" but found that EPA's interpretation was not
"clearly wrong or unreasonable," and therefore controlled."
EPA's insistence on a narrow interpretation of the term "device"
may have been well founded. EPA could have believed, for instance, that
the idea of allowing a state to permit a source to use a "bubble" concept
to avoid installing control equipment specifically described in a SIP was
potentially inconsistent with the concept of RACT. As discussed above,
the 1977 Amendments required every major source in a nonattainment area
to utilize reasonably available control technology. 7
If the fifth circuit had been less deferential, however, EPA might
well have lost. EPA's interpretation was not unreasonable, but arguably,
neither was Louisiana's. The phrase "other eqivalent equipment or
means"'168 could well have been interpreted to allow for "means" other
than a physical piece of equipment. EPA's dispute with the state was a
result of the sovereigns' failure to define exactly what "equivalent" meant.
B.

The AMOC Automotive Cases

In United States v. General Motors Corp.,169 the definition of
"equivalency" per se was not at issue. The issue was the extent of the
authority that EPA had given the states to approve equivalency plans, and
this time, EPA lost. 70
The SIP provision EPA sought to enforce was a Texas SIP rule"
that limited the VOC content of coatings used by General Motors in
painting operations at its Arlington, Texas automobile assembly plant."
164. ML at 498.
165. Il
166. l&
167. See supra text accompanying notes 110-113; see also 1977 Amendments § 129(b),
91 Stat. 685, 747-48 (adding § 172(b)(3)) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
7502(b)(3)).
168. 810 F.2d at 496 (citing L.A.Q.R. 22.3.1.4) (emphasis added).
169. 702 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
170. I. at 134.
171. 31 T.A.C. § 115.191(8) (approved in 1980).
172. GeneralMotors, 702 F. Supp at 134.
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General Motors acknowledged that it was using coatings with a VOC
General Motors
content greater than that specified by the rule."
asserted that it had obtained an exemption from the rule from the
Executive Director of the Texas Air Control Board ("TACB"), pursuant to
another SIP provision.'
Any person affected by any control requirements of Chapter
115 of this title [relating to Volatile Organic Compounds]
may request the Executive Director to approve alternate
methods of control. The Executive Director shall approve
such alternate methods of control if it can be demonstrated
that such control will be substantially equivalent to the
methods of control specified in this regulation.'75
In October, 1985, the TACB issued an AMOC to General
Motors.'76 The TACB accepted General Motors' claim that it applied its
coatings with a higher "transfer efficiency" than rule 115.191(8) assumed
such facilities would achieve.'77 "Transfer efficiency" refers to the
amount of paint that ends up on the vehicle as a percentage of the amount
used. "' The higher the transfer efficiency, the less VOCs are emitted
into the air.'79 General Motors claimed that its transfer efficiency was
high enough to offset the effect of the higher VOC content of its paint.8
EPA did not contest that the TACB's AMOC for General Motors
was substantially equivalent to rule 115.191(8), or that General Motors was
in compliance with its AMOC.'' EPA nevertheless sued General Motors
for using coatings with higher VOC content than allowed under the
rule. ' 2 EPA argued that it must expressly approve an AMOC as a SIP

173. Id. at 135.
174. 31 T.A.C. § 115.401(a).
175. GeneralMotors, 702 F. Supp. at 136. The court in General Motors interpreted this
language not only as a delegation of authority to the TACB to approve equivalent
AMOCs, but as a requirementthat the TACB do so when equivalency is demonstrated.
Id. at 136 n.6.
176. Id. at 135.
177. Id.

178. Id. at 135 n.3.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 137.

19941

STATE-FEDERAL CONFLICr REGARDING SIPs

revision before it could be adopted as an alternative means of
compliance.'
The district court, citing the dicta in FloridaPower, concluded that
EPA's interpretation of the SIP was not entitled to deference.' But it
was hardly necessary for the court to take a position on the "deference"
issue because the court did not consider the case a close call.3 5 It found
that EPA's interpretation flew in the face of "the express language of
section 115.401(a), which expressly permits an alternative method of
control to achieve substantially equivalent compliance with national
ambient air standards,"' 86 and upheld the AMOC.8 7
Read in a vacuum, EPA's action in General Motors is rather
puzzling. Why would EPA have risked such a defeat in a case where it
did not even allege that the defendant's emissions were greater than those
contemplated by the original SIP? Why was the principle of whether
AMOCs should be required to be SIP revisions so important?
The answer is that EPA was beginning to realize that it simply
could not trust the states to determine "equivalency." EPA thought that if
it did not take control of the AMOC process, the states would, perhaps
unknowingly, approve plans which did permit excess emissions. United
States v. Ford Motor Co., showed that EPA was right to be concerned.
The facts of Ford were similar to those of General Motors. EPA
brought an enforcement action against Ford for violating SIP limitations
on the VOC content of coatings at Ford's Claycomo, Missouri plant. 9
The SIP emission limits were based on EPA's determination of RACT for
car coating operations."
As in General Motors, the defendant did not dispute that its
coatings did not meet the RACT limits.' But the Missouri SIP at issue
in Ford contained an AMOC provision which allowed for a source to
submit an Alternate Compliance Plan ("ACP") to the Missouri Department

183. Id. at 136.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

let at 138.
Id.
Id. at 137.
Id at 138.
736 F. Supp. 1539.
I at 1540.
Id at 1543.
Id at 1544.
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of Natural Resources ("MDNR").'
The ACP which Ford submitted and
which MDNR approved parallelled that in General Motors. It provided for
Ford to use coatings with a higher "transfer efficiency" than the "baseline"
93
efficiency which Ford claimed the original SIP limit envisioned.
The original SIP, however, did not specify what that baseline
efficiency was.'94 Ford claimed, and the approved ACP provided, that
the baseline should be thirty percent. 95 EPA claimed, however, that the
baseline should have been fifty percent.'96 EPA claimed that the ACP,
using the lower baseline, permitted Ford to emit higher levels of VOCs
than would have been permitted under the original limit. 97
As in General Motors, EPA also argued that each ACP must be
approved by EPA as a SIP revision. But as in General Motors, the court
held that this argument was contradicted by the express terms of the ACP
provision of the SIP. 98 The court, however, seems to have been
convinced by EPA's argument that the ACP did not provide for
"equivalence." It stated that "EPA presented compelling evidence that
Ford has been operating in violation of the SIP."'"
Bluntly put, the
court seems to have been fairly well convinced that Missouri did not know
what it was doing.
The court concluded, however, that "the equivalence of these two
plans [is not] the central issue."2" Judge Wright viewed the matter in
the following manner:
The issue raised by the EPA's argument is how the EPA
can attack what it perceives to be a defective ACP.
Obviously, the EPA believes it can pursue this issue in an
enforcement action against the source. The Court disagrees.
It is this Court's opinion that because EPA delegated
authority to Missouri to approve ACPs, and because
Missouri acted in good faith in approving the plan, EPA's

192. Id. at 1545.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
Id. at 1544.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1547.

198. Id.
199. Id. at 1546.

200. Id. at 1548.
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only recourse if it believes the ACP is substantially
inadequate to attain NAAQS is to pursue revision of the
ACP through administrative procedures. 1
The court argued that any other result would be unfair to the
sources involved, which would be unable to rely on the state's ACP.
Review of state-approved ACPs on the grounds advanced
by EPA would undermine the provisions for ACPs in many
state SIPs, whatever the outcome of that review. No
rational source would avail itself of an ACP if a court could
invalidate that ACP in a judicial enforcement action at the
[E]very day of operation under an ACP
behest of EPA ....
would increase the penalty for its noncomplying
operations.'
The Ford decision demonstrated that EPA's concern about the
principle involved in General Motors was justified. If states had the
power to approve AMOCs without submitting them to EPA for review,
they might approve AMOCs which actually permitted emissions in excess
of those allowed by the original SIP. But once EPA had approved an
AMOC, the courts, or at least the court in Ford, would not allow EPA to
pursue an enforcement action against the source based on the violation of
the original SIP. That is, the court would allow the source would be
EPA's only remedy
allowed to rely on the state's determination.'
4
would be to demand a separate SIP revision itself."
One does not have to agree with the Ford decision to conclude that
EPA's approval of the AMOC SIP provisions was a mistake. EPA should
have recognized that "equivalence" might prove to be a slippery concept
to apply. Furthermore, it should have recognized that the courts might
view the provisions as sweeping delegations of discretionary authority,

201. Id. The recourse to which the court was referring is EPA's power to order revision
of a SIP "[w]henever the Administrator finds on the basis of information available to him

that the plan is substantially inadequate to achieve [the goals of the Clean Air Act]."
CAA § 110(a)(2)(H)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(H)(ii).
202. 736 F. Supp. at 1548 (W.D. Mo. 1990).
203. Id.

204. Id.
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which states were entitled to exercise and on which sources were entitled
to rely.
Losing General Motors and Ford convinced EPA that AMOCs
were trouble. In the past few years, the EPA air program has struggled,
through guidance, negotiations with the states, and other means, to
eliminate Ford-style AMOC provisions from SIPs. 5 But the concept of
"flexibility" had not completely lost its appeal and would reemerged as
EPA prepared to implement the 1990 Amendments.

IV. THE TITLE V OPERATING PERMIT REGULATIONS: DID WE
LEARN ANY LESSONS?

The sheer volume of the 1990 Amendments suggests that Congress
learned some lessons from the experience of implementing the 1977
Amendments. The attainment program in Title I received a large share of
congressional attention."°
And at least one section, section 183,
indicates that Congress apparently listened to state regulators' pleas for
more federal mandates when it instructed EPA to "issue control techniques
guidelines" for thirteen new categories of air pollution "within three years
after November 15, 1990."27 As of March 1994, however, EPA had
published only two new CTGs in final form. Nevertheless, comprehensive
and sound CTGs offer one of the best ways to avoid state-federal conflicts
by providing clear statements of RACT, and thus unambiguous means of
compliance to states writing SIP revisions.
Congress also made the job of nonattainment planning easier for
state and federal regulators by specifying more particular program elements
for nonattainment area plans.2"8 While some of these requirements are
complicated and others will undoubtedly cause some economic hardship,
they will tend to make nonattainment plans more uniform and specific
throughout the country. While there may be complaints that this goal does
not allow for enough flexibility to meet local needs, the testimony of the
state regulators suggests that this is not among their chief concerns.

205. Interviews with EPA personnel (April 1994).
206. See, e.g., 1990 Amendments §§ 102-107, 104 Stat. 2412-65 (codified at scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q).
207. CAA § 183(a), (b)(3)-(4), 42 U.S.C. § 751 lb(a), (b)(3)-(4).
208. 1990 Amendments § 102, 104 Stat. 2412-23 (amending §§ 171-178) (codified at
7501-7508).
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Besides, when the air pollution problems of the large urban centers in the
nonattainment sector are studied in detail, the causes are hardly unique
from one city to the next. In any event, a likely advantage of greater
uniformity in the SIPs will be less uncertainty as to what they mean and,
therefore, less state-federal conflicts in their implementation.
However, in implementing another aspect of the 1990 Amendments,
section 502, which requires all states to establish permit programs covering
thousands of air pollution sources, EPA may have set the stage for a
new round of disputes with the states by adopting a permit provision
providing for "equivalency determinations."2 '

Prior to the 1990 Amendments, the Clean Air Act required federal
permits only for new or modified sources." Section 502 now requires
' as opposed to
operating permits for, inter alia, all "major source[s], 212
just new or modified sources. Section 504 states that each permit shall
include "enforceable emission limitations and standards ... and such other

conditions as are necessary to assure compliance with applicable
requirements of this Act, including the requirements of the applicable
implementation plan."2 3 Section 502 requires each state to develop its
own permit program, subject to EPA approval, and directs the
Administrator to promulgate regulations establishing the minimum
elements of a permit program.214 Section 505 further requires that each
state or local permitting authority provide EPA with a copy of its proposed
permit and that EPA will have forty-five days to object to the issuance of
the permit.215
When EPA published its initial draft of that regulation, it
acknowledged that "dealing with [permit] applications ... is likely to tax

209. CAA § 502, 42 U.S.C. § 7661a.
210. Id.
211. See 1977 Amendments § 129(b), 91 Stat. 746-48 (adding §§ 172(b)(6), 173)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7502(b)(6), 7503)
212. As defined in § 501(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7661(2), "major sources" includes all sources
defined as "major" under § 302, 42 U.S.C. § 7602 (which includes facilities which have
the potential to admit one hundred tons of any air pollutant per annum) or under Part D

of Title I. CAA §§ 171-178, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508.
213. Ma § 504(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(a).
214. Ma § 502, 42 U.S.C. § 7661a.
215. Id § 505, 42 U.S.C. § 7661d.
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Federal and State resources up to or beyond their limits. ' 21 6 One would
think that EPA, recognizing the enormity of this task and the short fortyfive day review period in which this task must be completed, would make
every effort to make the permit review process as simple as possible and
would take steps to ensure that the permitting process is free of the discord
and confusion reflected in the cases discussed above. The student of
General Motors and Ford might, then, be somewhat shocked to read the
following passage in the Preamble to EPA's final permit rule:
Equivalency determinations. In order to take advantage of
the flexibility provided by the Title V permit program, EPA
has added a provision [section 70.6(a)(1)(iii)] which allows
States to develop alternative emissions limits through the
permit program. Under this section, a State may choose to
adopt a SIP provision that would authorize sources to meet
either the SIP limit or an equivalent limit to be formulated
in the permit process. Such a provision would allow a
State to build additional flexibility into its SIP program. 7
To quote the comic strip Pogo, "What in the ever-lovin', blue-eyed
world is a-goin' on here?" EPA has spent years in federal court arguing
with states about their equivalency determinations." 8 EPA has heard
state regulators complain to Congress that they want less, not more,
discretion. EPA is well aware that it will be hard pressed to undertake a
meaningful review of the thousands of permit applications it expects to
receive. EPA is also aware that it will only have forty-five days to review
each proposed permit. Even so, EPA has triumphantly announced that the
states will be able to build flexibility into their SIP programs by allowing
them, in the permitting process, to replace SIP limits with "equivalency
determinations"
The only recognition apparent in this regulation of EPA's previous
difficulty in enforcing AMOCs appears in the Code of Federal Regulations
and states:

216. EPA estimated that "over 34,000 sources are included in the definition of major
source," and recognized that "limited numbers of qualified [state and federal] staff will
be available." 56 Fed. Reg. 21,725 (1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70).
217. 57 Fed. Reg. 32,276 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70).
218. See supra Section HI.
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any permit containing such equivalency determinations shall
contain provisions to ensure that any resulting emissions
limit has been demonstrated to be quantifiable, accountable,
enforceable, and based on replicable procedures[;]" 9
and in EPA's Preamble, which provides somewhat reassuring definitions
Furthermore, unlike in the Ford situation, EPA must
of those terms.'
review, and may object to, each permit-authorized "equivalency
determination" in advance. Also, if EPA finds that "cause exists," it may
"terminate, modify, revoke and reissue" a permit which has already been
issued?'
Still, one cannot help but think that section 70.6(a)(iii) is a very
risky bit of regulating. Will forty-five days always be enough time to
determine if an "equivalent" limit is "quantifiable, accountable,
enforceable," and, in fact, equivalent? If not, can we really expect EPA
to review permits that have already been issued, and revoke them for cause
when the cause is that EPA itself failed to recognize that the equivalent
limit was inappropriate? Even if EPA was bold enough to do that, would
states and sources dutifully comply or would they engage in spirited
litigation, arguing about what Congress meant by "cause," and arguing the
merits of EPA's belated assessment of the equivalency determination?
EPA officials are aware of, and are concerned by, these
questions. m The debate is on-going within the EPA as to what degree
of flexibility to allow under this regulation and how to write sufficient
criteria to determine equivalency of alternative means of compliance. It
is not impossible that through such guidance and a careful review of
individual equivalency proposals, EPA will be able to avoid conflicts with
the states. If conflict arises, the courts may be convinced that EPA should
always win on the grounds that section 505 gives EPA sweeping powers
over permits. In any event, the adoption of section 70.6(a)(iii) certainly
enhances the likelihood of additional litigation.

219.
220.
221.
222.

40 C.F.R. § 70.6(a)(iii) (1993).
57 Fed. Reg. 32,276 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 70).
CAA §§ 505-506, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661d-7661e.
Interviews with EPA personnel (April 1995).
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CONCLUSION

On balance, the reasoning of the pro-federal cases, such as
Congoleum and American Cyanamid, is more persuasive than that of the
pro-state cases. Thus, in cases where the federal interpretation of a SIP
provision conflicts with the state interpretation, other things being equal,
the federal interpretation should control.
The pro-state courts, however, can certainly find support for their
reasoning in the language of the Clean Air Act. The Act still states "that
the prevention and control of air pollution ...
is the primary responsibility
223
'
of States and local governments."
EPA itself still pays substantial
deference to that principle. Its permit program regulations reflect a
continuing commitment to allowing states substantial flexibility in
implementing the Clean Air Act.
Unfortunately, hard experience seems to have shown that the Clean
Air Act works best when it is least flexible. To the extent that the states
have had broad discretionary authority to develop SIP provisions, they
have found it difficult to do so. When EPA has given states broad
discretionary authority to implement SIPs provisions, it has often regretted
it.
The conflict in the cases discussed above mirrors a fundamental
conflict inherent in the Clean Air Act itself. As the case law on statefederal conflict progresses, it will reflect the direction that the Act, slowly
but surely, has taken: a movement away from state flexibility and toward
increasing federal control.

223. CAA § 101(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3).

